Some of the meaning of a discourse is encoded in its linguistic forms.
Thls is the truth-conditional meaning of the propositions those forms express and entail. Some of the meaning is suggested (or 'implicated', as Grice would say) by the fact that the encooer expresses just those propositions in just those linguistic forms in just the given contexts [2] . The first klnd of meaning is usually labeled 'semantics'; it is decoded. The second Is usually labeled 'pragmatlcs'; it is inferred from clues provided by code and context.
Both kinds of meaning are related to syntax in ways that we are coming to understand better as work continues in analyzing language and constructing processing models for communlcatlon.
We are also coming to a better understanding of the relationship between the perceptual and conceptual structures that organize human experience and make it encodabla in words.
(Cf. [I] Certalnly within the last twenty years, the discipline of computational linguistics has expanded its view of its object of concern.
Twenty years ago, that vlew was focussed on a central aspect of language, language as code [3] . The paradigmatic task of our dlsclpllne then was to transform a message encoded in one language into the same message encoded In another, using dictionaries and syntactic rules.
(Originally, the task was not to translate but to transform the input as an ald to human translators.)
Colncldentally, those were the days of batch processing and the typical inputs were scientific texts --written monologues that existed as completed, static discourses before processlnK began. Then came interactive processing, brlnglng with It the opportunity for what is now called 'dialogue' between user and machine.
At the same time, and perhaps not wholly colnoldentally, another aspect of language became salient for computational linguistics --the aspect of language as behavior, with two or more people using the code to engage in purposeful ~ communication.
The inputs now include discourse in which the amount of code to be interpreted continues to grow as participants in dialogue interact, and their interactions become part of the contexts for on-golng, dynamic interpretation. Llke Sldner, they use syntactic clues and tlke Shanon, they seek to identify the conceptual structures that underlie behavior.
Code and behavior interact with intentions in ways that are still mysterious but clearly important. The last two papers stress the fact that using language is intentional behavior and that understanding the purposes a discourse serves is a necessary part of understanding the discourse itself. Mann claims that dialogues are comprehensible only because participants provide clues to each other that make available knowledge of the goals being pursued.
Alien and Perrault note that intention pervades all three layers of discourse, pointing out that, in order to be successful, a speaker must intend that the hearer recognize his intentions and infer his goals, but that these intentions are not signaled in any simple way in the code.
In all of these papers, language is viewed as providing both codes for and clues to meaning, so that when it is used in discourse, Its forms can be decoded and their import can be grasped.
As language users, we know that we can know, to a surprising extent, what someone else means for us to know.
~e also sometimes know that we don't know what someone else means rot us to know.
As computational linguists, we are ~rying to figure out precisely how we know such things.
